
In April 2009, at a summit in Trinidad, Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chávez, crossed the room and handed President Barack Obama a worn copy of Eduardo Galeano’s Open Veins of Latin America. Within a day the 38-year-old book had leapt up the Amazon best-seller list. The gesture was theater, but it made a point: more than any statistic, a story about the past still shapes how Latin Americans and their northern neighbor see each other.
Three books offer three very different versions of that story. Galeano’s Open Veins (1971) is about money: the gold, silver, sugar, rubber and oil that flowed out of the region for five centuries and the dependency that flow left behind. Greg Grandin’s Empire’s Workshop (2006) is about method: how Washington used Latin America as a testing ground for the tactics of power it would later carry to Iraq and beyond. Jorge Majfud’s The Wild Frontier: 200 Years of Anglo-Saxon Fanaticism in Latin America (Spanish edition 2021, English edition 2025) is about belief: the myths of race, God and the frontier that allowed a self-described republic of liberty to see its conquests as acts of self-defense.
Read together, the three books form something like a cross-section of empire. Galeano examines its stomach, Grandin its hands and Majfud its mind. They agree on far more than they disagree. But where they part ways, on what drives empire and therefore on how it might end, their differences are as revealing as their shared indictment.
The Three Books at a Glance
| Open Veins of Latin America | Empire’s Workshop | The Wild Frontier | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Eduardo Galeano (Uruguay) | Greg Grandin (United States) | Jorge Majfud (Uruguay / United States) |
| First published | 1971 | 2006 | 2021 (Spanish); 2025 (English) |
| Central question | Why is a rich continent poor? | How did Latin America shape the way the US exercises power? | What beliefs let a republic of liberty justify conquest? |
| Engine of empire | Extraction and capital accumulation | Strategy, institutions and political coalitions | Myth, race, religion and the frontier |
| Main imperial actors | Spain, Portugal, Britain, the United States, foreign capital | Washington’s policymakers, the military, the New Right | “Anglo-Saxon fanaticism”: settlers, presidents, press, preachers, the CIA |
| Period covered | 1492 to about 1970 | Early 1900s to the Iraq war | 1822 to 2020 |
| Form | Lyrical essay organized by commodity | Narrative history built on archives | Dated chronicles drawn mostly from English-language sources |
| Implied remedy | Break dependency through structural change | Recognize the pattern before it is exported again | Strip away the myths; recover buried memory |
Galeano: The Wealth That Made the Poverty
Galeano was barely 30, a journalist in Montevideo, when he finished Open Veins. Its argument is stated in the opening pages and repeated, like a refrain, for some three hundred more: Latin America is poor not in spite of its riches but because of them. The region, in his telling, specialized early in losing. Its gold and silver financed Europe’s rise; its soils were turned over to single crops for foreign markets; its mines and plantations were built for export, not for the people who worked them.
The book’s first half is organized by commodity, almost like a geological survey of plunder. Silver from Potosí, in what is now Bolivia, filled Spanish coffers and ended in the banks of Genoa and Amsterdam. Sugar turned northeastern Brazil and the Caribbean into slave economies whose fertility was spent within generations. Rubber, cacao, coffee, bananas, copper, tin and oil follow, each with its boom, its bust and its abandoned towns. The second half moves to the 20th century, tracing how foreign corporations, international lenders and local elites kept the pattern alive after independence.
Galeano’s framework came from the dependency school of Latin American economics, associated with scholars such as Andre Gunder Frank and, in a more moderate form, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto. Its premise was that development and underdevelopment are two faces of one global system. The wealth of the core required the poverty of the periphery. Local oligarchies are not innocent in this account: they appear as junior partners who profited by keeping their countries in the role of supplier.
The book was banned by the military dictatorships of Uruguay, Chile and Argentina, which only enlarged its readership. It also drew lasting criticism. Free-market writers, notably the Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, called its portrait of Latin America a caricature that blamed outsiders for problems of the region’s own making. In 2014, Galeano himself startled an audience in Brazil by saying he could no longer bear to reread it. He explained that he had written it without adequate training in economics, and he found its prose of the traditional left heavy. He did not, however, renounce its central claim.
What Open Veins offers is a theory of motive. Empire, for Galeano, is above all an economic machine. Armies, missionaries and diplomats appear in its pages, but they serve the logic of extraction. The United States enters late, as the newest and most efficient heir to a five-century process.
Grandin: The Laboratory of Power

Greg Grandin, a historian then at New York University and now at Yale, wrote Empire’s Workshop in the shadow of the Iraq war. His question was not why Latin America is poor but why the United States behaves as it does in the world, and his answer pointed south. For more than a century, he argued, Latin America has been where Washington rehearsed the techniques of an informal empire, one that rarely annexed territory but insisted on the right to decide who governed beyond its borders.
The early chapters follow the Marines through the Caribbean and Central America in the first decades of the 20th century, then the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin Roosevelt, which Grandin reads as a lesson in the uses of restraint and soft power. Washington learned it could secure its interests through trade, finance and friendly governments rather than occupations. The Cold War brought coups in Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964 and Chile in 1973, and the training of Latin American officers in counterinsurgency.
The heart of the book is the 1980s. In Ronald Reagan’s wars in Central America, Grandin finds the birth of a political coalition that would dominate American foreign policy for a generation: neoconservative intellectuals, evangelical Christians and free-market economists. Each group found a cause in Central America, and the region gave them a place to practice. Proxy armies such as the Nicaraguan contras let Washington fight without American casualties. An Office of Public Diplomacy managed opinion at home. Democracy promotion, through bodies such as the National Endowment for Democracy, offered an idealistic language for intervention.
The economic laboratory came first, in Chile, where economists trained at the University of Chicago applied free-market shock therapy under Gen. Augusto Pinochet. Grandin argues that this model of market reform backed by force became a template exported far beyond the region.
The workshop analogy is literal. Grandin traces how the people moved, along with the methods. Officials who ran Central America policy in the 1980s, among them Elliott Abrams and John Negroponte, returned to senior posts under George W. Bush during the war on terror. In his account, Iraq was not a break with tradition but its export.
Grandin’s empire is driven less by any single motive than by the problem of power itself: how to project it, legitimize it and sustain domestic consent for it. Economic interests matter, and so does ideology, but his attention is on technique, institutions and the coalitions that keep an empire running.
Majfud: The Myths That Make It Possible

Jorge Majfud, a Uruguayan writer who teaches at Jacksonville University in Florida, says his book began with a massacre. On Aug. 3, 2019, a gunman killed 23 people, most of them Hispanic, at a Walmart in El Paso after posting a manifesto about a “Hispanic invasion of Texas.” Majfud dedicates the book to those victims and sets out to show that the manifesto’s ideas were not new. Their clichés, he writes, date to the early 19th century.
The Wild Frontier is structured as an extended chronology of brief, dated vignettes, more than 150 in total, from Stephen Austin’s colonists arriving in Mexican Texas with their enslaved laborers in 1822 to the 2019 coup in Bolivia. The book is organized into three movements, “By Land” (1820 to 1880), “By Sea” (1880 to 1950) and “By Air” (1950 to 2020), tracing a trajectory of expansion that began with military outposts on Indigenous territories and culminated in drones and clandestine agencies. Majfud relies almost exclusively on English-language sources, from congressional oratory and presidential addresses to declassified records and the American press, in order, as he phrases it, to regard the United States from the outside, from within.
His central claim is that the United States was born with a split personality. One side is the Enlightenment republic of Jefferson and Franklin. The other, older and more popular, is what Majfud calls Anglo-Saxon fanaticism: an anti-intellectual, deeply religious culture convinced of its racial superiority and its God-given right to the lands of others. The second identity, he argues, took power with Andrew Jackson in 1828 and has wrapped itself in the language of the first ever since.
Majfud reduces this worldview to a short list of myths that recur across two centuries. The most important is “they attacked us first”: the conviction, from the wars on Native nations to Mexico in 1846, the Maine in 1898 and the Cold War, that every invasion is a defense. Others include the claims that the United States never had a dictatorship, that it brought freedom and democracy to other nations and that it is a nation of laws. He answers each with the record: a republic built on slavery, a long list of supported dictatorships, and broken treaties with Indigenous nations and Mexico.
The book’s most original contribution is its distinction between two English words that Spanish renders with one. The frontier, Majfud writes, is a line to be pushed outward, the space of pioneers and heroes. The border is a wall meant to keep the conquered out. The two work together: the frontier advances into other people’s land, and the border protects the conquerors from the people they displaced. In his reading, the Mexicans who became “invaders” in the territory taken from them in 1848 are the ancestors of today’s migrants, branded the same way.
The primary sources do much of the arguing. Majfud quotes John C. Calhoun telling the Senate in 1848 that the United States was a government of the white race and should never incorporate Mexico’s Indian population. He quotes Senator Albert Beveridge in 1900 describing an imperial destiny ordained by God for the English-speaking peoples. And he shows how, after World War II made open racism unspeakable, the same impulses took on new names: anticommunism during the Cold War, then the wars on drugs and terror.
Majfud’s empire is ideological at its core. Money matters to him, and United Fruit, Wall Street and the oil companies appear on almost every page. But in his view greed alone could not have mobilized voters, soldiers and preachers. What made conquest possible, and what made it feel virtuous, was the myth.
Where the Three Agree
On the essential facts, the three books tell the same story. All three treat the 1954 coup in Guatemala as a turning point: an elected government that tried to redistribute idle land owned by United Fruit, overthrown by a CIA operation that relied on propaganda as much as on weapons. Chile after 1973 serves as a laboratory in all three: for Galeano, who returned to the dictatorships of the Southern Cone in the afterword he added in 1978; for Grandin, as the first test of market reform imposed by force; and for Majfud, as the place where Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek made their peace with dictatorship. Grandin and Majfud, writing after Galeano’s book appeared, both describe the contra war in Nicaragua as a war against a small, poor country waged in the name of freedom.
They share a structural point as well. None of them treats Latin America as merely a victim of outside force. Galeano’s local oligarchies, Grandin’s allied militaries and Majfud’s “three sectors” through which Washington controlled the region, the churches, the national armies and the ruling classes, all describe partnerships between empire and the elites who profited from it.
Finally, all three write against forgetting. Galeano wanted his readers to see the past in the poverty around them. Grandin wanted Americans to recognize, in Iraq, policies their government had tested before. Majfud insists that the forgetting of historical facts is never accidental but strategic, and that the victors’ version of the past is itself an instrument of power.
The connections are personal, too. Majfud is a fellow Uruguayan who devotes a chapter of The Wild Frontier to Galeano’s death in 2015, defending him against Vargas Llosa’s verdict that he had invented a caricature of Latin America. Majfud’s response is that critics blamed Galeano’s readers for the region’s underdevelopment while ignoring the documented coups and plots that Galeano described. He also draws on Grandin, citing Empire’s Workshop and especially Grandin’s Pulitzer Prize-winning The End of the Myth (2019), which traced how the frontier ideal turned into the border wall. On that theme, the American historian and the Uruguayan essayist are close allies.
Where They Part Ways
The deeper differences begin with a simple question: what does an empire want?
Galeano answers: wealth. Empire is a system for moving value from the periphery to the center, and its politics follow its economics. That gives Open Veins its moral clarity and its weakness. It explains why, but it often skips how. Dictators, Marines and propagandists appear in its pages, yet they serve mostly as instruments of capital. Critics have noted that its framework struggles to explain why some former colonies, such as South Korea, escaped poverty, a question that economists like Ha-Joon Chang would later answer partly by pointing to the active state policies that dependency theory tended to discount.
Grandin answers: power, and the means to keep it. His empire is a learning organism. It experiments, makes mistakes, absorbs lessons and builds institutions. Where Galeano sees continuity, Grandin sees evolution: from occupation to the Good Neighbor’s soft power to covert action, proxy wars and democracy promotion. His focus on coalitions at home is distinctive. In his telling, Central America mattered less for its bananas than for what it did for American politics, uniting the forces of a New Right that would run foreign policy for decades. Latin America is not just the object of empire but the school where it was trained.
Majfud answers: confirmation of a belief. In The Wild Frontier, the driving force is a mentality: the conviction of racial and religious superiority and of a frontier that must always be pushed. He makes a striking claim that the impulse is to take by force whatever can be taken, as if the act of taking mattered more than the thing taken. That is an argument neither Galeano nor Grandin would make. For Majfud, economic interests are real, but they ride on a myth that is older, deeper and harder to dislodge than any balance sheet.
Time and Scale
The books also see different spans of history. Galeano’s story starts in 1492 and covers every empire that profited from the region, Spain and Portugal and Britain before the United States. Grandin focuses almost entirely on the American century. Majfud’s 200 years begin not in Latin America but on the American frontier, with the dispossession of Native nations and the conquest of half of Mexico. That choice makes his most provocative point: that the methods later used against Guatemala or Chile were first practiced at home, against peoples inside what became the United States.
Majfud divides Washington’s interventions into four phases, the last three of which overlap with Grandin’s account: territorial expansion (1780 to 1850), naval power and direct military occupation (1850 to 1930), indirect intervention through propaganda and intelligence (1920 to 1990) and economic and financial warfare (1970 to 2020). The difference lies in the starting point. For Grandin, Latin America is the workshop. For Majfud, the workshop was the frontier, and Latin America was its next extension.
Race
No difference is sharper than the place of race. In Open Veins, race appears mainly as a byproduct of labor systems, slavery on sugar plantations and the exploitation of Indigenous miners. In Empire’s Workshop, it is present but secondary to strategy and political economy. In The Wild Frontier, race is the foundation. Majfud argues that Washington chose protectorates and puppet dictators over annexation in the Caribbean and Central America precisely because their populations were too Black, Indigenous and mestizo to be admitted into the Union. The idea of Anglo-Saxon superiority, he argues, did not disappear after 1945. It was renamed.
Form and Evidence
The books also differ in how they persuade. Galeano writes as a poet of economics, with metaphor and moral fury. Grandin writes as an academic historian, with archives, footnotes and a measured tone. Majfud chose a hybrid: short, dated scenes in the present tense, sharp irony and a deliberate decision to drop footnotes in favor of naming documents, dates and speakers precisely enough for readers to check themselves. He leans heavily on the words of the powerful, so that presidents, senators and generals, in their own speeches and memos, testify against their own myths.
Each approach carries risks. Galeano’s lyricism invites the charge of oversimplification. Grandin’s measured scholarship reaches fewer readers outside the academy. Majfud’s polemical voice and his broad category of “Anglo-Saxon fanaticism” may strike some readers as an essentialism of its own, though he takes care to distinguish Washington and its corporations from the American people, millions of whom, he notes, reject that ideology.
Why the Argument Still Matters
Half a century after Open Veins, the questions these books raise have not gone away. Debates over lithium in Bolivia, Chile and Argentina, copper in Peru and oil in Venezuela still turn on Galeano’s question of who profits from the region’s resources. Grandin’s warning that methods tested in Latin America would be exported is borne out every time sanctions, covert operations or democracy promotion are used to pressure a government Washington dislikes. And Majfud’s account of the frontier and the border reads like a commentary on today’s immigration politics, from the language of “invasion” to the rhetoric of walls.
The three books are best read not as rivals but as layers. Galeano explains the motive, Grandin the machinery and Majfud the story that makes the machinery feel righteous. Without Galeano’s economics, Majfud’s myths could seem to float free of material interest. Without Grandin’s institutions, both Galeano and Majfud can leave readers wondering how an empire actually decides and acts. And without Majfud’s attention to belief, the other two struggle to explain why so many ordinary citizens, who gained little from United Fruit or the contras, cheered their country’s interventions as acts of liberation.
Majfud ends his introduction with a modest hope: that his book will serve some purpose, however small, for truth and justice. Galeano wrote in a similar spirit, and so, in a more academic register, did Grandin. Together, they make a case that the history of the Americas cannot be understood by looking only at what was taken or how it was taken. One must also ask what people needed to believe in order to take it.
Works Cited
Galeano, Eduardo. Las venas abiertas de América Latina. Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1971. English edition: Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent. Translated by Cedric Belfrage. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973; 25th anniversary edition, 1997.
Grandin, Greg. Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006.
Grandin, Greg. The End of the Myth: From the Frontier to the Border Wall in the Mind of America. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2019.
Majfud, Jorge. La frontera salvaje: 200 años de fanatismo anglosajón en América Latina. Rebelde Editores, 2021.
Majfud, Jorge. The Wild Frontier: 200 Years of Anglo-Saxon Fanaticism in Latin America. San Francisco: Humanus Publishing, 2025.
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, and Enzo Faletto. Dependency and Development in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979 (Spanish original 1969).
Frank, Andre Gunder. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.
Chang, Ha-Joon. Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. London: Anthem Press, 2002.
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