
September 11, 2001, did not abolish liberal democracy in the West. Elections continued, constitutions remained in place, courts continued to function, and governments continued to speak the language of rights and freedom. Yet something fundamental changed. The attacks created the political conditions for a permanent state of emergency in which surveillance, militarization, border control, executive power and foreign intervention could expand while continuing to present themselves as defenses of democracy.
The question, then, is not whether the United States and its allies suddenly became fascist after 2001. They did not. The more difficult question is whether liberal democracy began incorporating practices historically associated with authoritarian rule: permanent surveillance, exceptional detention, militarized policing, racialized suspicion, censorship and information control, and the normalization of war as an instrument of politics. Read together, the work of Edward Said, Noam Chomsky, Judith Butler, Achille Mbembe, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Aviva Chomsky, Julian Go, Jorge Majfud and Kris Ruijgrok offers a way of understanding this transformation not as a sudden rupture but as the intensification of older structures of empire and racialized power.
Edward Said would immediately complicate the idea that the post-2001 order began with the attacks themselves. His analysis of Orientalism asks us to look at the intellectual and cultural machinery that makes certain populations appear threatening, backward or inherently violent. The “War on Terror” did not merely respond to an enemy that already existed; it also produced categories through which entire populations could increasingly be interpreted through the vocabulary of security. Once the Muslim, the Arab, the foreigner or the immigrant becomes legible primarily as a potential threat, surveillance begins to appear not as an extraordinary intrusion into democratic life but as a reasonable response to danger.
Noam Chomsky’s critique of power pushes this argument in another direction. The crucial issue is not simply the existence of propaganda but the political conditions under which governments can obtain public consent for policies that would otherwise be unacceptable. The extraordinary expansion of military power after 2001—from Afghanistan and Iraq to the broader global architecture of the War on Terror—demonstrated how the language of existential danger could make permanent war politically intelligible. Chomsky’s question therefore sits beneath Said’s: who has the power to define the threat, and who has the power to make that definition appear self-evident?
But Said’s emphasis on representation and Chomsky’s emphasis on power are not competing explanations. They reinforce each other. The construction of the enemy makes the exercise of power legitimate; the exercise of power reinforces the construction of the enemy.
Judith Butler allows us to see what happens to human beings once this process becomes institutionalized. Her concept of grievability asks why some lives are publicly recognized as lives whose destruction constitutes a moral catastrophe while others can be treated as collateral damage. The question is not simply who is killed. It is whose death becomes politically visible. In the context of the War on Terror, Butler’s analysis exposes the unequal distribution of vulnerability: the security of some populations can be presented as requiring military violence against populations whose suffering remains politically distant or insufficiently recognizable. War therefore does not merely destroy lives; it establishes frames through which some lives become more valuable, more recognizable and more mournable than others.
Here Butler comes remarkably close to Achille Mbembe’s necropolitics, although their theoretical vocabularies are different. Mbembe asks what it means for modern political power to determine who may live and who may be exposed to death. Butler asks why some lives become less grievable; Mbembe asks how political systems organize spaces in which certain populations can be subjected to extreme violence, abandonment or death. Together they shift the discussion away from the comforting assumption that modern liberal states exercise power primarily by protecting life. Modern power can also operate by distributing vulnerability unevenly.
This is where the history of empire becomes impossible to ignore. Julian Go’s postcolonial sociology challenges the tendency to treat liberal modernity and imperialism as separate historical phenomena. He argues that sociology itself was shaped within an imperial standpoint and that modern social theory often obscures empire, colonialism, and the agency of colonized peoples. His intervention matters here because it prevents us from interpreting post-2001 militarization as an inexplicable deviation from an otherwise purely liberal tradition. The relationship between democracy and empire has always been more complicated. The United States could promote democratic institutions while simultaneously exercising imperial power abroad; indeed, its colonial history in places such as the Philippines and Puerto Rico demonstrated that democratic language could coexist with imperial administration.
Go therefore changes the historical question. Instead of asking, “Why did liberal democracy suddenly become militarized after 2001?”, we might ask, “What happened when older imperial technologies of power were brought back into the political center of Western societies?” His work on postcolonial sociology explicitly calls attention to the “imperial standpoint” embedded in conventional accounts of modernity.
Aviva Chomsky’s work on borders and migration extends that historical argument into the present. If the War on Terror transformed the foreign enemy into a permanent security concern, the militarization of borders transformed mobility itself into a security problem. The migrant and refugee increasingly become objects of surveillance, detention, biometric identification and exclusion. The border is no longer merely a geographical line. It becomes a dispersed technological apparatus capable of following people, sorting them and determining who is allowed to move.
At this point Kwame Anthony Appiah introduces an important challenge to the entire security paradigm. His cosmopolitanism begins from the proposition that our moral obligations cannot be confined to national membership. The cosmopolitan ideal treats human beings as members of a shared moral community rather than as valuable primarily according to citizenship.
The post-2001 security state moves in precisely the opposite direction. It repeatedly divides the world between citizens and foreigners, insiders and outsiders, safe populations and suspect populations. Appiah’s cosmopolitanism therefore exposes a fundamental contradiction: liberal democracies proclaim universal human rights while simultaneously constructing political categories that make the rights and security of some human beings conditional upon nationality, immigration status, religion or perceived threat.
This contradiction becomes even sharper when viewed through Jorge Majfud’s Latin American perspective. Majfud’s work repeatedly reminds us that militarization does not remain neatly confined to the battlefield. Latin American history offers numerous examples of armies, police forces, and security institutions being presented as guardians of “order,” “freedom,” and “national security” while protecting highly unequal social structures. In his analysis of race, displacement and political violence, military institutions often become defenders of elite interests while the poorest populations bear the consequences.
Majfud therefore adds something important to the post-9/11 discussion: violence exported abroad can return home as political technology. A society accustomed to seeing military intervention, surveillance and exceptional violence as legitimate tools abroad may gradually become more comfortable with the same logic domestically. The distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy begins to erode.
This is also why the language of “security” deserves scrutiny. Security sounds neutral. Everyone wants to be secure. But security is never simply a technical condition; it is also a political decision about whose insecurity matters and whose insecurity can be tolerated. Butler’s grievability, Mbembe’s necropolitics, Said’s Orientalism and Appiah’s cosmopolitanism converge precisely here. They ask different questions, but together they reveal the political process through which some bodies are protected while others are surveilled, excluded, detained, bombed or abandoned. The digital age has now transformed this older architecture of control.
Kris Ruijgrok’s work with Marcus Michaelsen on digital authoritarianism is particularly important because it demonstrates that authoritarian control no longer requires the abolition of democratic institutions. Their analysis identifies digital surveillance, censorship, information manipulation and the disruption of information flows as mechanisms through which power can suppress criticism and accountability. More importantly, they emphasize that digital authoritarian practices are produced through configurations involving both state and non-state actors and can cross conventional regime boundaries.
This changes the meaning of authoritarianism itself. The old authoritarian state needed to control newspapers, television, universities and political organizations. The contemporary state can potentially monitor communications, collect biometric information, track movements, analyze social networks and participate in an information environment increasingly mediated by private technological corporations.
James S. Pearson’s formulation of digital authoritarianism reinforces this point: digital technologies can be used to surveil, repress, and manipulate citizens. The important implication is that authoritarianism does not necessarily arrive wearing a uniform. It can arrive as an algorithm, a database, a camera, a biometric checkpoint, an automated risk assessment or a platform policy. And this brings us back to the paradox at the center of the post-2001 West.
The liberal state increasingly possesses technologies capable of doing things that earlier authoritarian regimes could only dream about. Yet the state can acquire these capacities while maintaining elections, courts, constitutions and a free press. Authoritarian techniques can therefore coexist with liberal institutions.
That is why the concept of neofascism must be used carefully. If it means that contemporary Western governments are simply replicas of Mussolini’s Italy or Hitler’s Germany, the concept is historically inadequate. But if it describes the incorporation of militarism, permanent emergency, surveillance, racialized exclusion, enemy construction and authoritarian techniques into formally democratic institutions, then it becomes a question worth investigating rather than merely a rhetorical insult. The dialogue among these thinkers suggests something more precise.
Said tells us how the enemy is culturally produced. Chomsky asks who possesses the power to produce and enforce that narrative. Butler asks which lives become recognizable and grievable within it. Mbembe asks what happens when political power distributes the capacity to live and the exposure to death. Go reminds us that these mechanisms cannot be separated from the history of empire. Aviva Chomsky shows how the security paradigm moves through borders and migration. Appiah confronts it with the universal moral claim that human beings cannot be reduced to national categories. Majfud reminds us, from the historical experience of Latin America, that militarization and elite power have repeatedly coexisted with the language of democracy. And Ruijgrok shows how these older mechanisms are being reconstructed through digital technologies.
They therefore converge on a disturbing possibility without necessarily sharing the same political theory: the central transformation after 2001 may not have been the disappearance of liberal democracy, but its increasing coexistence with mechanisms of control that were once considered incompatible with it.
The citizen remains a citizen, but is increasingly observable. The border remains a border, but becomes increasingly technological. The war remains geographically distant, but its political logic moves inward. The emergency remains officially temporary, but its institutions become permanent. The state continues to speak of freedom while expanding its capacity to monitor those who exercise it. And the enemy remains somewhere “out there,” even as the technologies created to find the enemy increasingly operate everywhere.
Perhaps this is the most important lesson of the post-2001 period. The danger to liberal democracy does not necessarily come from a dramatic moment when democracy is formally abolished. It can come through the gradual normalization of practices that appear individually reasonable: another surveillance program, another biometric database, another border technology, another emergency authorization, another military deployment, another algorithm for identifying risk, another restriction justified by security. Each measure may appear exceptional. Together they create a political order.
The question facing the West is therefore not simply whether it remains democratic. It is what kind of democracy is being produced when the state becomes increasingly militarized, surveillance becomes normalized, borders become technological systems, and entire populations are rendered permanently suspect?
The answer may lie somewhere between the liberal democracy that Western states continue to claim and the increasingly sophisticated architecture of control that they have built since 2001. That is not necessarily fascism in the historical sense.
It may be something more contemporary—and potentially more difficult to recognize precisely because the institutions of liberal democracy remain standing while the technologies and practices of control are being built inside them.
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