Digital Authoritarianism: Censorship, Surveillance, and Resistance

Digital Authoritarianism (2024) by Kris Ruijgrok and Marcus Michaelsen

We are the media. Internet and political change in Iran by Marcus Michaelsen
We are the media. Internet and political change in Iran by Marcus Michaelsen

Published online on March 21, 2024, as part of The Oxford Handbook of Authoritarian Politics (Oxford University Press), the chapter titled Digital Authoritarianism represents one of the most comprehensive and rigorously framed academic treatments of the subject to date. Positioned within a landmark reference volume that gathers the foremost scholarship on authoritarian governance, the chapter by Kris Ruijgrok and Marcus Michaelsen offers scholars and practitioners alike a conceptual map through an increasingly complex and consequential terrain. It is both a state-of-the-field synthesis and an original analytical intervention — a rare combination in handbook literature.

Kris Ruijgrok is Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Amsterdam, where his research focuses on digital politics, authoritarian resilience, and the relationship between internet use and political mobilization. He is also the author of Internet Use and Protest in Malaysia and Other Authoritarian Regimes (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), a book-length study that established him as a leading voice on how digital infrastructure intersects with political contestation in non-democratic settings. Marcus Michaelsen brings complementary expertise in digital rights, transnational repression, and the surveillance of diasporic activists and civil society organizations. Together, they bring a formidable breadth of empirical and theoretical experience to this collaborative chapter.

The timing of this chapter is not incidental. Over the past decade, digital authoritarianism has moved from a peripheral concern in comparative politics to one of its most urgent research frontiers. Authoritarian regimes across the globe have dramatically expanded their capacity to shape, restrict, and exploit digital information environments — not only to suppress dissent but to manufacture consent, entrench surveillance infrastructure, and project power beyond their borders. Academic and policy communities have struggled to keep pace with these developments analytically. The Ruijgrok and Michaelsen chapter addresses this gap head-on, providing a structured framework that is both empirically grounded and theoretically sophisticated.

The Central Argument

The chapter’s most significant analytical move is its insistence on shifting away from a government-only framework toward what the authors describe as a multi-actor approach to understanding digital authoritarianism. For much of the field’s early development, scholarship implicitly or explicitly centered the state as the primary — sometimes sole — agent of digital repression. Governments blocked websites, governments deployed spyware, governments drafted the laws that legitimized censorship. This state-centric lens, while not wrong, was increasingly inadequate to account for the actual complexity of how digital authoritarianism operates in practice.

Ruijgrok and Michaelsen argue that digital authoritarianism is better understood as a phenomenon shaped by configurations of actors — including private technology companies, platform intermediaries, civil society organizations, international bodies, and ordinary citizens — each of whom plays a role in either enabling, contesting, or mediating authoritarian digital practices. This reframing matters enormously for analytical and policy purposes alike. If censorship is only possible because a platform company fails to resist government demands, then the platform is not a neutral technical layer but an active participant in the authoritarian arrangement. If surveillance infrastructure is built using components manufactured and sold by democratic-country corporations, the political economy of digital repression extends far beyond the borders of any single authoritarian state.

The shift to a multi-actor framework thus opens up new research questions, reveals previously obscured mechanisms of accountability, and challenges researchers to think more carefully about causality and complicity. It is a conceptual contribution that will likely shape how scholars design studies and frame policy recommendations for years to come.

Four Key Forms of Digital Authoritarianism

1. Online Censorship

Online censorship — the blocking, filtering, and restriction of access to digital information — is perhaps the most visible and widely studied form of digital authoritarianism. It encompasses a spectrum of practices, from the coarse blocking of entire platforms (as when China blocks Google or Twitter, or when governments temporarily restrict Facebook during periods of unrest) to more subtle and technically sophisticated forms of filtering that target specific content, keywords, or user accounts. The political consequences of censorship are multiple: it limits the informational resources available to citizens and opposition movements, reduces the capacity of journalists and activists to communicate and organize, and shapes the epistemic environment in which citizens make political judgments.

Ruijgrok and Michaelsen draw attention to the layered nature of censorship infrastructure, which typically involves collaboration between state agencies, internet service providers, and platform companies operating under varying degrees of legal compulsion or commercial incentive. This layering means that responsibility for censorship is often diffuse — and that reform efforts must therefore engage not only with governments but with the full range of actors who make censorship technically possible.

2. Internet Shutdowns

Internet shutdowns — the deliberate disruption or total blackout of internet connectivity — represent a blunter and more dramatic form of digital repression. Governments have increasingly resorted to shutdowns during elections, protests, military operations, and moments of acute political uncertainty, treating the internet as a communications infrastructure that can simply be switched off when its free operation becomes inconvenient or threatening. The consequences of shutdowns extend well beyond political communication: they disrupt economic activity, impede access to emergency services, and impose disproportionate costs on already marginalized populations.

The chapter situates shutdowns within the broader architecture of digital authoritarianism, noting that they are often used in conjunction with other repressive practices and that their deployment tends to escalate in severity over time as governments grow more confident in their legality and effectiveness. Documenting and attributing shutdowns has become a significant area of civil society and research activity — organizations such as NetBlocks and Access Now have developed real-time monitoring capacities — and the chapter engages with this evidence base to assess the political logic and empirical patterns of shutdown use.

3. Digital Surveillance

Digital surveillance — the monitoring of citizens’ online behavior, communications, and movements — is in many respects the most insidious of the four practices, because it operates largely invisibly and its chilling effects are felt even by those who are never directly targeted. Authoritarian regimes invest heavily in surveillance infrastructure, ranging from the mass collection and analysis of social media data to the deployment of commercial spyware against journalists, lawyers, opposition politicians, and diaspora activists. The revelations associated with tools such as Pegasus have made clear that sophisticated surveillance is not limited to states with advanced indigenous technical capacities; commercially available surveillance-as-a-service products have dramatically lowered the barrier to entry.

Ruijgrok and Michaelsen emphasize that surveillance performs multiple political functions simultaneously: it generates intelligence that enables targeted repression; it signals to potential dissidents that they are being watched, inducing self-censorship; and it provides regimes with information advantages that can be weaponized in negotiations with domestic and international interlocutors. The political economy of surveillance technology — in particular the role of Western and Israeli companies in supplying authoritarian regimes — is a thread that runs through the chapter’s multi-actor framework and connects digital authoritarianism to broader debates about export controls and corporate accountability.

4. Online Information Manipulation

Online information manipulation — encompassing state-sponsored disinformation, propaganda, and influence operations — represents the most dynamic and analytically challenging of the four practices. Unlike censorship or shutdowns, which operate through restriction and removal, information manipulation works through addition: flooding the information environment with misleading, distorted, or fabricated content designed to confuse, polarize, or deceive. Authoritarian regimes have become increasingly sophisticated in their use of these tactics, deploying armies of paid commenters, automated bot networks, and coordinated inauthentic behavior across domestic and international platforms.

The chapter engages with a growing body of research — including work on domestic influence operations, which is an area in which Ruijgrok himself has made scholarly contributions — to map the variety of information manipulation tactics employed by authoritarian regimes and to assess their political effects. One of the key analytical challenges the chapter addresses is distinguishing between genuine grassroots political expression and coordinated manipulation campaigns, a distinction that matters both empirically and normatively. The political consequences of information manipulation are diffuse but potentially profound: eroding public trust in institutions and independent media, deepening social polarization, and creating informational conditions in which authoritarian governance becomes more defensible and democratic alternatives more difficult to imagine.

A Multi-Actor Approach

The chapter’s call for a multi-actor approach is not merely a rhetorical gesture toward complexity; it is a substantive methodological and theoretical commitment that reshapes how researchers should approach the study of digital authoritarianism. State-centric analysis, for all its strengths, tends to treat digital repression as a product of government decisions executed through state agencies and state-controlled infrastructure. This model is increasingly untenable in an era when the internet is governed, operated, and shaped by a heterogeneous assemblage of public and private actors whose interests, incentives, and capacities vary enormously.

Private technology companies — platform operators, telecommunications providers, cloud services, and device manufacturers — occupy a structurally pivotal position in the digital authoritarianism ecosystem. Their decisions about what content to host, what government demands to comply with, and what technical standards to adopt have direct consequences for the scope and effectiveness of authoritarian digital control. Ruijgrok and Michaelsen argue that understanding how digital authoritarianism actually functions requires analyzing the actor configurations — the specific combinations of state and non-state actors, their relationships, and their relative power — within which repressive practices are embedded.

International actors, including foreign governments, multilateral institutions, and transnational civil society networks, also figure in this framework. Export control regimes, diplomatic pressure, technical assistance programs, and international human rights law are all mechanisms through which external actors can influence — for better or worse — the digital authoritarian practices of particular states. The chapter’s multi-actor framework thus situates digital authoritarianism within a genuinely global political economy, resisting the methodological nationalism that has sometimes limited the explanatory reach of comparative politics scholarship.

Resistance and Contestation

One of the chapter’s most valuable contributions is its sustained attention to resistance. The study of digital authoritarianism has at times risked a certain determinism — a tendency to catalog the expanding toolkit of repression without adequately accounting for the ingenuity and persistence of those who contest it. Ruijgrok and Michaelsen resist this tendency, devoting careful analysis to the ways in which citizens, activists, journalists, and civil society organizations push back against digital authoritarian practices.

Circumvention tools — virtual private networks (VPNs), the Tor network, mirror sites, and encrypted messaging applications — have become essential infrastructure for political opposition in many authoritarian contexts. Their adoption is not simply a technical workaround; it is a political act, an assertion of the right to communicate freely in environments designed to deny that right. The chapter situates circumvention within the broader ecology of resistance, noting that its effectiveness depends not only on technical characteristics but on the capacities and risk tolerances of the users who deploy it, as well as on the technical sophistication and political priorities of the regimes that seek to block it.

Alternative platforms — decentralized social networks, diaspora-run media outlets, encrypted community forums — represent another dimension of resistance, one that seeks to create communicative spaces outside the reach of authoritarian control. International pressure, including foreign government sanctions against surveillance vendors, platform transparency reporting requirements, and support for digital rights organizations, constitutes a third layer of contestation. The chapter’s treatment of resistance is analytically significant because it reinforces the multi-actor framework: if authoritarianism is not simply a state project but an actor configuration, then resistance is similarly dispersed across a range of actors and sites of struggle.

Why This Chapter Matters

Synthesis chapters in major Oxford Handbooks occupy a distinctive and influential position in academic life. They serve as the authoritative entry points into a field for graduate students beginning their research, as reference points against which subsequent empirical and theoretical contributions are measured, and as legitimating frameworks that define the boundaries and research agenda of a scholarly community. In this respect, the Ruijgrok and Michaelsen chapter on Digital Authoritarianism carries particular weight: it is not simply a review of existing literature but a conceptual intervention that reframes the field’s central questions and offers a vocabulary for future scholarship.

For researchers in comparative politics, international relations, and science and technology studies, the chapter provides a coherent framework for designing studies that capture the multi-actor complexity of digital repression without losing analytical precision. The four-fold typology of censorship, shutdowns, surveillance, and information manipulation offers a common vocabulary that can facilitate comparative research across cases and regions. The multi-actor framework opens up productive research questions about corporate complicity, international diffusion, and the domestic politics of digital regulation.

For policymakers and civil society organizations working on internet freedom and authoritarian resilience, the chapter offers both a diagnostic tool and a strategic map. By demonstrating that digital authoritarianism is a multi-actor phenomenon, it implies that effective responses must also be multi-actor in character — engaging not only with authoritarian governments but with the technology companies, international institutions, and domestic civil society organizations that shape the digital environment. This is a message with direct implications for how democratic governments structure their digital diplomacy, how platform companies think about their responsibilities in authoritarian contexts, and how civil society organizations allocate their advocacy resources.

Conclusion

The Digital Authoritarianism chapter by Kris Ruijgrok and Marcus Michaelsen is a landmark scholarly contribution that will serve as a key reference point in political science for years to come. Its analytical rigor, conceptual clarity, and breadth of empirical engagement make it an essential read for anyone seeking to understand how authoritarian regimes exploit and weaponize digital infrastructure — and how citizens, activists, and institutions push back.

The chapter also reflects the broader arc of Ruijgrok’s research agenda. His 2021 book Internet Use and Protest in Malaysia and Other Authoritarian Regimes (Palgrave Macmillan) established the empirical and theoretical foundation for much of his subsequent work, demonstrating through rigorous comparative analysis how digital connectivity shapes the conditions for political mobilization in non-democratic settings. His ongoing work on domestic influence operations further extends this research program into the domain of information manipulation, where the interaction between state strategy and citizen response is particularly complex and consequential. The Oxford Handbook chapter synthesizes and advances this body of work while situating it within the broadest possible scholarly framework.

The urgency of studying digital authoritarianism is, if anything, increasing. As artificial intelligence transforms the scale and sophistication of surveillance and information manipulation, as authoritarian states develop new forms of digital cooperation and standard-setting, and as democratic governments grapple with the dual challenge of regulating their own digital environments while countering authoritarian influence abroad, the need for conceptually rigorous, empirically grounded scholarship has never been greater. Ruijgrok and Michaelsen have made an indispensable contribution to that collective intellectual project — one that stands as a model of engaged, policy-relevant academic scholarship at its finest.

Kris Ruijgrok and Marcus Michaelsen, “Digital Authoritarianism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Authoritarian Politics, Oxford University Press, published online March 21, 2024.

Bibliography

Berenschot, Ward, Kris Ruijgrok, et al. “The Infrastructure of Social Media Influence Operations: Cyber Troops and Public Opinion Manipulation in Indonesia.” The International Journal of Press/Politics, 2024.

Borra, Erik, et al. (including Kris Ruijgrok). A Field Guide to Using LLMs for Online Conflict Analysis. Digital Methods Initiative, 2024.

Michaelsen, Marcus, and Kris Ruijgrok. “Digital Authoritarianism.” In The Oxford Handbook of Authoritarian Politics. Oxford University Press, 2024 (advance online publication).

Ruijgrok, Kris. Internet Use and Protest in Malaysia and other Authoritarian Regimes: Challenging Information Scarcity. Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.

Ruijgrok, Kris. “From the Web to the Streets: Internet and Political Protests under Authoritarian Regimes.” Democratization 24, no. 3 (2017): 498–520.


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